of the provisions of the Charter has been inconsistent. It rarely defends the rights of the citizens against constitutional abuse by incumbents. The paper further agues that AU's response to cases of UCG has been rather reactive rather than proactive.
The African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (henceforth One of the important attributes of the Charter is its supposedly binding nature and the fact that it derives its authority and legitimacy from the Constitutive Act, which commits AU Member States to participatory democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, human rights, peace and security, as well as sustainable human development The Charter also builds on other various AU commitments to democratic governance through various declarations, decisions 6 The Charter came into force after ratification by 15 Member States-till date 23 Member States have ratified the Charter. Further details can be find at http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Charter%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Governance.pdf 7 See Status list at http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Charter%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Governance.pdf and instruments 8 . In essence, the Charter draws together different and various AU commitments into a legally binding document and as such has become Africa's reference point on democracy, elections and governance.
It has been argued that the underpinning rationale for the Charter lies in the long-standing years of concern about unconstitutional changes of government and the attendant political instability, insecurity and violent conflict 9 .
It also underscores the normative shift in African affairs from non-interference, which epitomised the OAU era to non-indifference as contained in the Constitutive Act of the Union. Importantly, provisions in Chapter eight (8) (5), in which case, the AU would be required to apply conditional sanctions, 15 The General Assembly decision clearly states that in cases of UCG, in additional to the suspension of the country, the following measure shall apply; a) Non-participation of the perpetrators of the UC in the election held to restore constitutional order, b) implementation of sanctions against any Member State that is provided to have instigated or supported an UCG in another Member State, c) Implementation of the Assembly of other sanctions including punitive economic sanctions.
that could come into effect should he proceed with the plan to change or tamper with certain clauses of the constitution.
The inability to proactively and adequately deal with Burkina Faso case could be linked to the internal mechanism for preventative response with the AU. The AU internal mechanism is prepared for responding to UCG that emanate from coup d'état, mercenary or armed group replacement of democratically elected government. Also, AU's response to UCG so far are around coup d'état and AU is yet to deal with cases of UCG emanating from refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government. Therefore, it could be argued that, it is either the AU lack experience on the cases scenarios or that the AU assumed that incumbents are the likely victims and not the perpetrators. The internal mechanisms and working of the AU is not adequately designed to respond to cases of UCG as a result of the two scenarios. The lack internal mechanism derailed efforts until the events of However, the DPA also pointed out that while popular uprising might not be recognised constitutionally, oppressive regimes and disregard for the rule of law by governments has in fact become the forerunner to uprising. Faso. Others argued that Egypt's re-admission was based on its financial contribution to the AU. Besides, the two arguments, it is clear that the AU not only applied its response inconsistently but also faced an interpretation dilemma. *** Despite the growing pattern of uprisings across Africa, the AU is still grappling with the conceptual confusion associated with UCG and popular uprisings. It also appears that the current definition as provided in both the Lomé Declaration and the Charter leave more questions than answers as to whether popular uprisings constitute an UCG. Although this could provides room for consideration of wide range of factors in determining how uprising could differ from one country to another, nonetheless, a guiding framework that would provides clarity to AU stance with regards to UCG and popular uprising still remains crucial. This was Finally, this paper argued that the gap in responding to situations of UCG by the AU could lead to further abuse of power by incumbents and oppressive regime, which in turn could trigger protests and uprising by citizens as a last resort. Important within this context is that governance deficits in member states has given rise to an unexpected concept-"popular uprising-thereby leaving the African Union in an interpretation dilemma. 27 Press Statement of PSC Workshop on Unconstitutional changes of Governments and popular uprisings in Africa -Challenges and Lessons learnt; AUC-PSC, Addis Ababa
